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A B S T R A C T
On 10 July 2003, a civilian coup was attempted in Anambra state in South-east
Nigeria. Barely two months after Chris Ngige was sworn in as the Peoples
Democratic Party (PDP) governor of Anambra, a team of armed policemen
disarmed his security detail and took him into custody. The governor’s attempted
ousting made public the breakdown of his relationship with his political god-
father, Chief Chris Uba, and sparked a debate on godfather politics in Nigeria.
Using the case of Anambra, this article investigates the complex network of
personalised relationships that holders of state power maintain with their national
and local clientelistic constituencies. It explores the political underpinnings of the
crisis and its links to national-level power dynamics, particularly within the ruling
party and the Obasanjo presidency.
I N T R O D U C T I O N
After a lengthy period of military-led democratic transition programmes,
retired general Olusegun Obasanjo was returned to power as the demo-
cratically elected President of Nigeria on 29 May 1999. In assessing the
trajectory of Obasanjo’s second ascendancy to power, many scholars and
commentators pointed to certain economic and social forces that, they
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argued, manufactured his good fortune (Anifowose & Olurode 2004;
Williams 1999). They argued that factors such as the death of M. K. O.
Abiola, a Yoruba southerner and the presumed winner of the annulled 12
June 1993 presidential elections, combined with increased pressures from
southern politicians for a shift of power from the north, as well as the armed
revolts in the Niger Delta and other key dynamics, created a deep sense of
outrage and agitation that threatened to engulf the country in anarchy if
the tyranny of the military continued. Ultimately it had become clear that
perpetual military rule had to make way for change, and the dominance of
Northern Nigerian elites had to be reframed. Williams (1999: 409–10)
argues that ‘ there was a need for a safe pair of hands that would guarantee
the status quo and save themilitary fromwholesale disgrace andhumiliation
by the embittered and resentful populace’, and an Obasanjo presidency
met that criterion.
Thus Obasanjo’s presidential candidacy as negotiated by former presi-
dent Babangida’s political machine received the blessing of ‘ the serving
and retired military hierarchy’ and his electoral victory was executed by a
fragile coalition of the retired military old guard, the conservative
Northern political elite and an emergent crop of nouveau riche military
politicians (ibid. : 411). Across the country, similar relations of power and
wealth were at play in producing the electoral victories of several politi-
cians in the 1999 state and local contests. This pattern of personalised
relationships together with the advantages of incumbency were decisive
factors in the re-election of Obasanjo and many sitting governors in the
2003 general elections. Only eleven governors lost their seats, and two of
those had switched party. All twenty-two incumbent PDP governors re-
ceived an automatic ticket for the gubernatorial elections, with the ex-
ception of the governor of Anambra, Chinwoke Mbadinuju, who lost the
primaries to Dr Chris Ngige, an unknown medical doctor who had been
selected by a powerful political entrepreneur in the state to stand in the
elections. This article focuses on the personalised relations that resulted in
the emergence of Ngige as the PDP gubernatorial candidate and then
governor of Anambra, and in the electoral crisis that followed his win. It
examines the swift unravelling of Ngige’s legitimacy and the subsequent
termination of his administration as a case that vividly illustrates the
complex relations of power and wealth that constitute the nucleus of pol-
itical power in Nigeria.
Back in 2002, Ngige’s modest political ambitions of becoming a senator
for the Anambra central zone were extraordinarily boosted when his path
crossed that of Chris Uba, a young wealthy businessman, PDP caucus
leader and party ﬁnancier in the South-East of the country with strong
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connections to the Obasanjo presidency.1 Through the ﬁnancial backing
and manoeuvrings of Uba’s political machine, Ngige was selected for the
gubernatorial candidacy of the PDP to replaceMbadinuju, whowas at odds
with his own godfather, Chief Emeka Oﬀor. Uba went on to orchestrate a
blanket rigging of the state election to put Ngige in oﬃce. Uba gained
infamous political stardom as a result of his fall-out with Ngige, but before
he became arguably the most well known political godfather in Nigeria, he
had within a short space of time garnered prime status within the PDP as
an eﬀective political entrepreneur. When asked in a newspaper interview
about his relationship with Uba, President Obasanjo described him as the
‘young man who helped the PDP to win the last elections in Anambra
state ’ (The News 29.11.2004). Uba was equally grandiose in describing his
inﬂuence by publicly declaring he had achieved the remarkably feat of
single-handedly ‘enthroning the entire democratic structures in the state ’
and‘put[ting] inpositioneverypoliticianinthestate ’ (Ibrahim2003;ThisDay
23.12.2004). Uba and Ngige’s political relationship and the crisis that
ensued in Anambra as a consequence of its breakdown produced the
most compelling narrative in modern Nigerian politics of the proliferation
of what Nigerians call ‘political godfathers ’, and underscored emergent
political patterns challenging the prospects of truly representative democ-
racy in Nigeria. Using the Anambra crisis as a case study, this article seeks
to provide an analytically coherent context for the phenomenon of political
godfatherism. It explores the political, social and cultural underpinnings
that made the Anambra crisis possible, and attempts to link them to state
and national-level power dynamics within the ruling party.
This paper ﬁrst conceptualises godfatherism and contextualises the
phenomenon within a broader framework of relevant literature. It then
discusses the 2003 PDP Anambra state primaries and the power relations
and intra-party struggle that inﬂuenced the process. The third section
examines the 2003 elections and the strategies used by godfathers to cap-
ture the process. The following section presents an analytical narrative of
the fall-out between Uba and Ngige and the events and issues surrounding
the crisis, together with the related Okija shrine scandal. The ﬁnal section
discusses the Obasanjo presidency’s approach to handling the Anambra
crisis, and its attempts to frame the consequent political disorder in the
state as an intra-party conﬂict and not a major national scandal.
T H E O R E T I C A L A P R R O A C H E S T O U N D E R S T A N D I N G G O D F A T H E R I S M
Over two decades ago, Richard Joseph (1987) argued that clientelism and
prebendalism were vital to the analysis of politics and society in Nigeria.
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He argued that political actors competing for control over power and
scarce resources often manipulate categories such as ethnicity and class
to gain advantage over their opponents, and suggested that clientelism
was not an alternative framework to understanding Nigerian politics and
society, but an embedded characteristic of such identities because both
patrons and clients merely utilised ‘outward’ categories to reinforce their
relationships and to mask their materialistic motivation (ibid. : 55).
Joseph’s work suggests that in Nigeria, prebendalism is socio-culturally
rooted in clientelistic relations that link individuals who do not necessarily
share the same ethnic, class or regional backgrounds in hierarchical
relationships built upon the exchange of political support for personal
material gain. Thus the justifying logic of prebendalism is that public oﬃce
is to be competed for and then exploited for the direct beneﬁt of the oﬃce-
holders and their reference group (ibid. : 8). This means that when electoral
politics was introduced in Nigeria, traditional patron–client relationships
were able to insert themselves into the framework of legal–rational
bureaucracy or ‘modern’ stateness and adapt to its parameters (Erdmann
& Engel 2006: 18). Patrons were able to capture and perpetuate indirect
control over scarce ‘new’ state resources by manipulating the new political
system. As a result, personal relations of patronage and clientelistic net-
works did not overwhelm the impersonal realm of legal rational
bureaucracy but suﬃciently impacted it to extract private beneﬁt.
In their seminal work in which they revisit the ‘analytical utility ’ of neo-
patrimonialism, Erdmann and Engel (ibid. : 18) describe the overlap when
‘ informal politics invades formal institutions ’, particularly in African so-
cieties such as Nigeria, and how this creates an interaction between the
private and public spheres. They argue that in looking at the layers of
domination in post-colonial Africa, one would observe that ‘elements of
patrimonial and legal–rational bureaucratic domination penetrate each
other ’ and construct what is referred to as neopatrimonialism; integral to
this are the concepts of patronage and clientelism (ibid. ; see also Ogundiya
2009). For them, whilst patronage serves as a political instrument for the
redistribution of collective goods such as roads and schools, clientelism
‘ implies a dyadic personal relationship between patron and client ’
(Erdmann & Engel 2006: 21).2 Therefore political clientelism is concerned
with the transactional links a politician has, for example, with a patron/
godfather that involve an exchange of support to gain public oﬃce in
return for the private use of state resources. Erdmann & Engel argue that
these transactions are made possible through the ‘societal uncertainty
created by public institutions ’ that are often unpredictable (ibid.). Patron–
client relationships harness the uncertainty that exists in neopatrimonial
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societies such as Nigeria and contribute to reproducing the very same
‘ institutional uncertainty [they are] designed to overcome’ (ibid.). This
ubiquitous political climate of uncertainty created by neopatrimonial rule
compels political actors to form hierarchical personalised relationships to
mitigate the uncertainty of their political fortunes.
Exploiting disorder
Chabal and Daloz’s (1999) paradigm on the political instrumentalisation
of disorder expands upon this notion of the utility of uncertainty, and
greatly enriches our understanding of complex political realities such as
godfatherism in modern Africa. They argue that most African societies are
characterised by weak and ineﬃcacious institutions that create acute
conditions of disorder which political actors remedy by resorting to ‘per-
sonal(ised) and vertical solutions ’ (ibid. : xix). Their notion of disorder does
not imply absurd and irrational circumstances, but refers to a realm where
rational political action exploits or proﬁts from informal political pro-
cesses. They point out that ‘ in a world of disorder there is a premium both
on the vertical and personalised infra-institutional relations through which
the ‘‘business ’’ of politics can be conducted and on access to the means
of maximizing the returns which the ‘‘domestication’’ of such disorder
requires ’ (ibid.). For example, connections to the presidency in Nigeria,
which controls the sale of lucrative oil blocs, are channels that are often
exploited to provide beneﬁts for the well-established cronyism of oil bloc
allocation.
Accordingly the political instrumentalisation of disorder ‘refers to the
process by which political actors in Africa seek to maximise their returns
on the state of confusion, uncertainty and sometimes even chaos, which
characterises most African polities ’ (ibid. : xviii). Chabal and Daloz point
out that these vertical and personalised relations are more functional than
horizontal ones, and as a result ‘ the business of politics is more usually
conducted along [these] informal vertical channels ’ (ibid. : 20). Therefore it
is clear that the ‘development of political machines and consolidation
of clientelistic networks within the formal political apparatus has been
immensely advantageous ’ to patrons seeking political prominence and
social status through the control of state resources as well as clients seeking
protection and political support (ibid. : 14). This leaves no incentive for
political elites to change arrangements that are beneﬁcial to expanding
their networks and increasing their access to the resources of the state.
Another contribution of Chabal and Daloz’s work is their articulation of
the notion of reciprocity or what they call the imperative of exchange.
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They argue that in African societies most actions, political or otherwise,
trigger an expectation of reciprocity, making even the most basic political
act such as voting acquire an instrumental connotation (i.e. the potential of
eliciting a reward purely because of the prevailing social context, ibid. : 158).
This aspect of political and socio-economic life is vital to our understanding
of how politics works in Nigeria.
Alternative frameworks
This article has not exhausted the catalogue of perspectives that provide
tools for interpreting godfatherism in Nigeria. However, I shall limit this
analysis to one ﬁnal concept : the notion of the party machine. As a con-
cept, party machine is closely related and established in American political
science literature, notably in Guterbock (1980). Guterbock describes a
machine as a speciﬁc type of political party, particularly ‘one which has a
tight, hierarchical organization, includes party agents at the grass roots
level, and systematically distributes patronage among its members ’ (ibid. :
3). He argues that the party machine seeks to gain oﬃce, like any other
regular political party in a competitive election, but is ‘primarily organized
around the material interests of its members ’ (ibid. : 1). A successful party
machine is able to beneﬁt its members in terms of money, jobs and other
material incentives, once it has successfully inﬂuenced election outcomes.
Corrupt foreign and local corporate ﬁrms favour party machines, because
they too operate on the motivation for proﬁt, and tend to support which-
ever organisation is able to protect their interests. The work of Guterbock
reveals the ability of party machines to attain and maintain political power
despite their fundamental contradictions of representation.
These concepts oﬀer interpretations of modern politics in Nigeria that
broaden our scope of analysis to accommodate a complex range of
political interactions, of which godfatherism is one. Political godfatherism
shares the ‘ﬁxation on the person [or persons] at the top’ that charac-
terises neopatrimonialism and political clientelism (ibid. : 13). It also shares
a focus on relations of varying dominance that political actors enter into,
based on a mutual self-interest in exploiting state resources. It reiterates
the logic of prebendalism that political contestation should be engaged
in for the purpose of re-appropriating the resources of the state for
private interests. And it reverberates the notion of the party machine be-
cause the idea that political parties are vehicles for the extraction of state
resources is abundantly evident in the Nigerian party system. As a result,
godfatherism is itself a multi-layered dynamic that is centred on the actual
(personalised) behaviours and relationships of political actors and the
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political organisations that are structured around them. Diﬀerent strands
of the arguments discussed help to explain the phenomenon of god-
fatherism, and the next section will be concerned with deﬁning this con-
cept and explaining its features in modern Nigerian politics.
Godfathers in politics
The military governments of Babangida and Abacha, and the democratic
transitions pursued by both administrations, provided perfect conditions
for the scale of political entrepreneurship that characterises modern
Nigerian politics to ﬂourish. The political parties that featured in these
transitions were tailor-made by the military government, and forced upon
the Nigerian people with the claim that these parties would be free from
the control of powerful political patrons because of their new beginnings.
However, this new breed of parties and politicians quickly came under the
control of old-style politicians and thus continued the political entre-
preneurship that has characterised competitive politics in Nigeria for such
a long time (Ihonvbere & Vaughan 1995: 78). Patronage and clientelistic
systems nourished by oil money participated in the drawn-out artiﬁcial
democratic agenda of the military that was ended by the sudden death of
General Sani Abacha in 1998. This abrupt end created the hurried cir-
cumstances under which many of the political parties that contested the
ﬁrst election in 1999 were organised (Lewis 2003). Many of the candidates
who succeeded in winning party nominations were politicians who had
garnered the approval and sponsorship of inﬂuential ﬁgures, who were
often ‘without any formal status in the political system or in the govern-
ment’ but were rich enough to fund campaigns for key positions and even
whole operations of political parties across states and regions (Ellis 2008:
457). Consequently the phenomenon of godfatherism can be deﬁned as a
system of inﬂuence whereby certain individuals or groups of individuals
possess the political, economic or social capacity to decide political party
nominations, and to also ensure that these nominees gain political oﬃce
for the chief purpose of servicing private interests. Godfathers enter per-
sonal transactional relationships with candidates in order ‘ to manipulate
politics behind the scene and beneﬁt ﬁnancially by using their positions to
cause contracts to be awarded to favoured companies ’ (ibid. : 458). The
inﬂuence of political godfathers stems not only from the state resources
that they control once public oﬃce is privatised, but also from their will-
ingness to deploy corrupt means, foment violence, and manipulate federal,
state and local political systems in favour of the candidates they sponsor
(Igbafe & Oﬃong 2007; Raﬁu et al. 2009). Candidates seek out inﬂuential
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individuals who have connections to the main centre of power, in this case
the presidency in Abuja, and negotiate for the support and protection they
need to survive competitive politics in Nigeria.
Explaining godfatherism
The terms ‘godfather ’ and ‘godfatherism’ have gained widespread cur-
rency among Nigerians and their usage has become common in academic
literature ; an examination of the usage of such familial/paternal meta-
phors highlights the way in which people perceive and interpret political
concepts that shape their everyday life (see Adeoye 2009; Olarinmoye
2008). In presenting themselves as ‘ fathers ’, political entrepreneurs project
the image of being a protector and provider, which masterfully disguises
the exploitative nature of their role. The use of this paternal imagery of
benevolence is widespread not only in Nigeria but throughout many
African societies. It is not uncommon for African presidents to portray
themselves as fathers to their nation, concerned with the welfare and
nurturing of the country as a father would his child (Schatzberg 2001). For
example, Coˆte d’Ivoire’s former president Felix Houphouet-Boigny was
often presented as the papa or ‘Old Man’ of the country by the media;
Kenya’s Jomo Kenyatta and Daniel arap Moi, Zaire’s Mobutu Sese Seko
and Cameroon’s Ahmadou Ahidjo, to mention a few, all presented
themselves as ‘ loving, caring, solicitous national fathers ’ (ibid. : 10). In the
same way, Nigeria’s Obasanjo was often referred to as ‘baba’ (meaning
‘ father ’) by the Nigerian press. Contained within this expression are the
expectations of reciprocity that exist in actual father and son relations.
The notion is that after a father has invested and supported a child
through his life, he should be allowed to eat the fruits of his labour – i.e.,
he has a right to beneﬁt from the child’s success. This means that political
elites who assume the role of godfathers do so in the belief that the in-
struments of state power that are attached to the public oﬃce they have
helped secure are by extension theirs to enjoy. This partly explains the
perception of many godfathers such as Uba, who explains his role as that
of an ‘ investor in people ’ (ThisDay 28.5.2006). The obvious caveat to that
statement is that he expected his investment in Ngige’s political career to
yield him a proﬁt. This thinking reﬂects Chabal and Daloz’s ‘ imperative of
reciprocity ’ that is part and parcel of the relationship between godfathers
and their prote´ge´s or candidates, because in each case, once political oﬃce
is won using the godfather’s political machine, the prote´ge´ is expected to
reciprocate this support under terms decided by the godfather.3 Former
Oyo State governor Victor Olulonye described this relationship in this
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way: ‘Money ﬂows up and down … these honourable members [of the
Oyo State House of Assembly], during the election period, they want the
patronage of the puppeteer. Afterwards money will ﬂow in the opposite
direction – back from the puppet to the puppeteer ’ (HRW 2007: 36). As a
result, Ngige’s refusal to reciprocate the ﬁnancial backing he received from
Uba (i.e. to allow the money to ﬂow in the opposite direction) ruptured his
relationship with Uba, and as with many such unstable political relation-
ships, this rupture produced a state of extreme political disorder in
Anambra.
E L E C T O R A L C O M P E T I T I O N I N A N A M B R A : T H E 2003 P D P
S T A T E P R I M A R I E S
The threat of military resurgence that restrained the investment potential
of the 1999 elections was contained when President Obasanjo retired most
of the senior oﬃcers who had held oﬃce under Generals Babangida and
Abacha. The retuned political environment was quickly ﬁlled by political
entrepreneurs keen to stake their claim to relevance and political power.
The inﬂuence of big money brought in by this mixed group of political
actors on each successive stage of the election process did not go unnoticed.
Darren Kew (2004) observed that the 2003 elections were so inundated by
cash that local banks during party primaries were often emptied of cash
by political ﬁnanciers and party members. Candidates and their backers
aggressively pursued party oﬃcials, traditional rulers and community as-
sociations with bribes and favours in a bid to garner support and gain an
advantage over their opponents.
The situation in Anambra was no diﬀerent. The incumbent governor
Chinwoke Mbadinuju and nine other aspirants including a comparatively
unknown Chris Ngige hotly contested the PDP state primaries.4 All
twenty-two PDP incumbent governors had been guaranteed the party’s
ticket for the gubernatorial elections on 19 April 2003, but Mbadinuju’s
clearance to contest as the PDP candidate was undecided ﬁrst as a result
of a disqualiﬁcation,5 and subsequently by the incessant postponement of
the primaries (ThisDay 4.1.2003). The PDP appeared to be reluctant to
conﬁrm Mbadinuju’s candidacy, possibly because his popularity in the
state had waned as a result of the controversial killing of the chairman of
the Anambra State branch of the Nigerian Bar Association, Barnabas
Igwe, and his wife.6 In addition to the battle for the gubernatorial ticket,
the disorder surrounding the primaries was exacerbated by a complex
power struggle within the PDP hierarchy to determine which candidates
would represent the party in the national and state assembly elections.
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Looking back at the 1999 elections when Chinwoke Mbadinuju
emerged as the state governor, his victory was reportedly masterminded
by his godfatherChiefOﬀor (Daily Champion 10.2.2006).Oﬀor, awell-known
businessman, party ﬁnancier and close friend of Vice-President Abubakar
Atiku, controlled formidable political machinery in the state that included
a faction of the PDP called the Anambra People’s Forum. In exchange for
Oﬀor’s backing to win the elections, Mbadinuju is said to have remitted
about !10 m on a monthly basis to Oﬀor, an arrangement that possibly
contributed to Mbadinuju’s inability to pay workers’ salaries in the state
(The News 29.11.2004). The relationship broke down, and Oﬀor ﬁelded a
new candidate for the elections in the hope of winning back control of the
state (ThisDay 3.2.2003). Equally vying for control of the state was Chris
Uba, who had positioned himself as a PDP leader in the South-East by
reportedly bankrolling the opening of Obasanjo’s December 2002 re-
election campaign in Enugu (Vanguard 3.3.2003). Uba also reportedly paid
for the campaigns of several politicians aspiring for the State House of
Assembly.
The ﬁrst set of national and state assembly primaries held in December
2002 was marred by violence and malpractice across Anambra. Several
incidences were reported that involved electoral materials being snatched,
delegates being intimidated and even attacked, and also inconclusive
elections in several constituencies. The Ihiala constituency was particu-
larly aﬀected by the violence and a repeat of the elections was called for in
Ihiala and ﬁfteen other constituencies (ThisDay 30.12.2002). Despite the
irregularities, Ngige emerged as the PDP ﬂag-bearer for the Anambra
central senatorial seat and Chris Uba’s elder brother, Dr Ugochukwu
Uba, won the ticket for the Anambra South senatorial seat. The release of
the PDP national assembly primaries result that indicated Ngige had won
drew a lot of criticism from PDP party members and aspirants, because
the results were not released at the locations where the primaries were held
in Anambra; instead, the electoral committee had travelled out to the
neighbouring state of Enugu to announce the results.7 In addition, before
the delegates from Awka North constituency concluded their vote for as-
pirants for the Senate and House of Representatives for Anambra Central,
a result sheet was leaked at the election venue that was identical to the
results released in Enugu the following day.
Chris Uba was accused by members of the PDP of meddling with the
party election process and being responsible for the confusion trailing the
results because he wanted them to favour his brother and other politicians
such as Ngige who had his backing. Joy Emordi, a female politician also
contesting a Senate PDP ticket, pointedly criticised Uba for nursing an
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ambition to be the next godfather of Anambra politics. She made scathing
comments to a newspaper, saying Uba ‘wants to determine the political
destiny of everyone in the state. He wants you to come and bow (sic) bring
money’ (ibid.). In response to the accusations of meddling levied against
him, Uba argued that his brother had earned a senatorial seat because he
(his brother) had contributed to the PDP and loyally supported Mbadinuju
when he served as Commissioner of Agriculture in Mbadinuju’s govern-
ment. Uba’s statement that ‘politicians should always try and honour
agreements made behind closed doors ’ further alluded to his view of
politics (ThisDay 10.1.2003).
The Anambra gubernatorial primary was twice postponed before it
was ﬁnally held on 3 January 2003. Mbadinuju was said to have won 184
of a total of 191 votes cast. Ngige was a distant third with just one vote
(ThisDay 4.1.2003). The nine other aspirants who lost out protested at
Mbadinuju’s win and claimed that the delegates who had voted in the
elections were mostly ward and local government-level supporters of
Mbadinuju and therefore were plainly partial toward him (Newswatch
3.2.2003). As an incumbent PDP governor, Mbadinuju was purportedly
able to consolidate his control over the party’s machinery through an
agreement brokered between Obasanjo and the twenty-two other PDP
governors that would ensure Obasanjo’s re-election and their return for a
second term in 2003. The strategy for implementing this agreement is said
to have involved a transfer of control over the party machinery in the
states from the so-called Abuja politicians to the state governors to allow
them to invest heavily in the party structure in preparation for a good
showing in the national elections (Newswatch 3.2.2003). Mbadinuju re-
portedly took advantage of this to strengthen his faction of the party, the
Anambra Victory Movement (AVM). An additional factor that favoured
Mbadinuju was the removal of the local government chairmen at the end
of their term in May 2002. This was favourable because the governors
were authorised to appoint caretaker committees to handle the adminis-
tration of the local government areas when the local elections were
delayed. Most governors took advantage of this opportunity to strategically
place their supporters at the ward and local level. This arrangement en-
sured that the playing ﬁeld for the gubernatorial primaries was tilted in
Mbadinuju’s favour.8
However, after numerous closed door caucus meetings Mbadinuju was
induced by the PDP hierarchy to step down, and another party election
was held on Sunday, 9 February 2003, in which Ngige won 174 of the 241
votes cast to beat six other aspirants. At a ceremony for the PDP
governorship candidates attended by party chieftains and supporters of
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the candidates, the PDP national chairman Audu Ogbeh acknowledged
Mbadinuju in his speech and hinted at the fact that Mbadinuju was
persuaded by the party to withdraw from the race: ‘The party appreciates
the sacriﬁce which Governor Mbadinuju made in accepting our sugges-
tions. And let me also say that the party will not let him down in the
commitment we have entered into’ (ThisDay 11.2.2003). Many media re-
ports suggested that Mbadinuju was promised an ambassadorial position if
he withdrew from the race. However, this promise never materialised, and
a month after losing the PDP gubernatorial ticket, Mbadinuju decamped
to the Alliance of Democracy (AD) as their gubernatorial candidate for
Anambra, sidelining the candidate who had earlier won the ticket
(Newswatch 6.4.2003).
M A G I C A L E L E C T I O N S
The state and national elections ofMarch/April 2003 succeeded in moving
Nigeria past the abrupt terminations that had impeded former civilian-to-
civilian political transitions. As notable as this may seem, the results of the
elections reﬂected a deeply ﬂawed process that raised questions about the
democratic legitimacy of the leadership that took oﬃce. The Nigerian
public for the most part were tolerant of the results and seemed resigned
to accepting an unchanged government that was beholden to the same
elite actors. International and domestic observers and the media on the
other hand were scathing in their criticism of the level of electoral mal-
practice and violence that beset the election period, as well as the seeming
passivity of the oﬃcial electoral body, the Independent National Electoral
Commission (INEC).
Irregularities in the process varied widely across the country. The inci-
dence of more blatant malpractices appeared to be localised, and was
more rampant in certain states or areas within states (NDI 2003). The
Niger Delta and South-East regions in particular were noted for more
instances where ballot boxes were stuﬀed with marked votes, and voters
were intimidated and turned away from the polls. Supporters and mem-
bers of the major political parties, chieﬂy the PDP, with the assistance
of INEC polling oﬃcials and the police, openly thumbprinted stacks of
ballots that were then dropped into boxes and taken to the Local
Government Administration (LGA) headquarters. The PDP had so
formidably thwarted the voting process through its co-option of the INEC
that in many cases the oﬃcials in charge never bothered to actually count
the votes. One observer noted that none of the polling stations he visited
operated with their ﬁnal tally sheet but tally sheets with results already
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ﬁlled out were available at the collation centres before the oﬃcial close of
the polls (Kew 2004: 161). His view was that ‘no count was necessary
because the PDP had already circumvented the process ’ (ibid. : 161). EU
observers also witnessed INEC oﬃcials marking ballots for the PDP, and
at one particular station, although only 85 names on the list of 743 regis-
tered voters were ticked, the ballot box was already full by midday
(EUEOM 2003). The elections in Anambra mirrored the problems in the
rest of the South-East region, the outcome being so disastrous because of
violent clashes between party supporters and the late distribution of voting
materials that new elections were called for in ﬁve of the eleven House
constituencies (Reuters 20.4.2003).
An aspect of the electoral process that was signiﬁcantly criticised for its
contribution to the problem of electoral fraud was the highly vulnerable
and complicated collation procedure put in place by the INEC to tally up
the votes. The NDI (2003) was uncomplimentary in calling it ‘ the only
systemof its kind in theworld’, and criticised the electoral body for adopting
a multi-tiered tabulation process that ‘opened up the electoral process to
widespread abuse during both the National Assembly and presidential/
gubernatorial elections ’. In the ﬁrst stage, votes were counted at the
polling stations, and passed on to collation centres that covered ten or
twenty units. The results then ﬂowed upward to the LGA level, to con-
stituency centres and then state INEC oﬃces, and ﬁnally to the INEC
headquarters in Abuja. Each stage was completed over a varied and over-
lapping length of time, and in several cases results changed considerably
as they moved upward. For example, in Anambra the results of one
National Assembly race in which a candidate was declared the winner
with 14,405 votes were suddenly cancelled and four days later new oﬃcial
results reported an increase in voter turnout by approximately 150%. This
boost beneﬁted the previously losing candidate who saw his vote count
soar from 13,076 to 67,857, while the original winner’s votes mysteriously
shrunk to just 5,065.
T H E P L O T A G A I N S T N G I G E
Ngige did not dispute that he had won the governorship of Anambra State
in 2003 largely through the formidable political machination of Uba.
Indeed during his inauguration ceremony – before their fall-out – Ngige
had broken protocol by asking all those present to stand up and ac-
knowledge the arrival of the unelected Uba. Furthermore, in his ﬁrst
speech as state governor, Ngige described the invaluable role Uba had
played in his victory by saying: ‘ this speech will not be complete if I do not
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give honour to whom its due … I will like to publicly acknowledge the
untiring and relentless eﬀorts of my old and dear friend, Chief Chris Uba
in making this day possible ’ (ThisDay 19.7.2003).
Subsequently Nigerians learned that not only had Uba heavily funded
Ngige’s campaign, but many of those involved in executing the removal
plot at the State House of Assembly9 were politicians whose election Uba
had helped to bankroll. The deputy governor, Dr Okey Udeh, who was
brieﬂy promoted to governor, was one such politician.
Ngige and Uba had apparently negotiated that Uba would have back-
ground control of the state’s resources in exchange for ﬁnancially backing
Ngige’s campaign. The signed resignation letter that was presented to
the assembly and an additional written contract – a declaration of
loyalty –had sealed this agreement. Uba, in an interview with Human
Rights Watch (2007: 67), claimed that the terms of their agreement
stated that Ngige was required to ‘exercise and manifest absolute loyalty
to the person of Chief Chris Uba as my mentor, benefactor and sponsor ’,
and further stipulated that Uba would have full control of all government
contract awards and appointments to Ngige’s cabinet. Also, in order to
ensure that Ngige would be compelled to adhere to this agreement, a
proviso was inserted that authorised Uba to ‘avenge himself in the way
and manner adjudged by him as ﬁtting and adequate in case of any
breach by Ngige that could not be settled through mediation’ (ibid. : 67). As
was widely reported, Ngige breached this agreement by turning down
Uba’s demands for !3bn (about £13 m) for installing him as governor,
and also refusing to instruct the accountant general to release an ad-
ditional !860m (about £3.5 m) to Uba for a building contract he had yet
to complete (ThisDay 11.7.2003). As a result of Ngige’s grievous defaults,
Uba had felt it was ‘ﬁtting’ and ‘adequate ’ for him to invoke the resig-
nation letter pre-signed by Ngige and to orchestrate his forceful removal
from oﬃce.
Beyond the written contract that Uba had entered into with Ngige to
enforce his control over the levers of power in Anambra, it was also re-
ported that Ngige and Uba had attended a ritual at the Okija shrine, an
important traditional shrine in the Ihiala district of Anambra, and Ngige
had sworn an oath of loyalty to Uba. According to the oath, supernatural
forces would visit calamitous consequences and possibly physical death
upon Ngige if he violated his agreement with Uba. Uba had apparently
required members of the State House of Assembly he had bankrolled to
swear similar oaths. The revelation of the Okija shrine aﬀair is worth
mentioning here because it ‘ served as a key part of the patronage network’
of Uba and it also brings to light the important and informal role
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traditional institutions continue to play in modern Nigerian politics (Ellis
2008: 459). The ﬁnal part of this section discusses the signiﬁcance of this
ﬁduciary role assigned to traditional beliefs and practices in political
dealings.
In his defence, Ngige claimed that he was forced to breach the contract
with Uba because his demands for power and control over the state
government had become excessive. Ngige alleged that Uba wanted to
decide key state appointments such as commissioners, the secretary to the
state government, all special advisers, aides and even Ngige’s personal
staﬀ. Ngige claimed that his insistence that the appointees be highly
qualiﬁed infuriated Uba, and as a result Uba had vowed ‘to teach him a
lesson’ (Vanguard 11.7.2003). In an interview with Human Rights Watch
(2007: 67), Ngige alleged that from the moment he took over as governor,
Uba inundated him with personal demands for money from the state
treasury.
Ngige’s confessions after the scandal erupted surprisingly helped him to
build a moderately positive image in Anambra State, as the public’s per-
ception of him became that of a governor who stood up to themanipulation
of his political godfather. Though the elections in the state were roundly
criticised as ﬂawed and the governor’s victory suspect, Smith (2007: 128)
concurs that ‘ the fact that Ngige reneged on the agreement and was now
the apparent target of a larger political machine was enough to make him
something of a folk hero’. Ngige capitalised on this popular support, using
it in his attempt to break away from Uba and retain his stolen mandate.
The public image he presented to the people of Anambra was that of
a victim of the corrupt political system: a courageous populist governor
who was resisting the eﬀorts of a powerful political godfather determined
to take over the state. Ngige further pursued his strategy of renegotiating
his status from that of a fraudulent governor to a defender of the public
interest by attending to pressing matters in the state, such as paying the
long-awaited salary arrears of civil servants and awarding contracts for
repairs to the state’s notoriously bad roads. These basic acts resonated
with many citizens of Anambra, particularly because former governor
Mbadinuju had left oﬃce hugely unpopular and deeply criticised for the
deterioration of state infrastructure and for perpetually defaulting in pay-
ing salaries to government workers, presumably because of the hefty ﬁ-
nancial burden that his relationship with his own godfather had placed
upon state ﬁnances.
Therefore, as time went on, Ngige’s trials at the hands of Uba’s well-
connected political machine, and the seeming complicity of high-ranking
members of the federal government, helped to recast his legitimacy and
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garnered him some support from within Anambra and sympathy from the
media (ThisDay 24.8.2005).
The Okija shrine aﬀair
The majority of Nigerian politicians, like many politicians across Africa,
publicly reject traditional religious beliefs and rituals, and instead associate
themselves with secular norms or profess belief in either the Christian or
Islamic faith. There is however, as demonstrated by the goings-on at
Okija, evidence that many political behaviours and relationships are still
inﬂuenced by local traditional institutions that have retained their cultural
credence in spite of so-called modernisation. In a comprehensive study,
Ellis (2008) notes how the strategy of leaders of the nationalist movement
in the 1930s for making inroads into diﬀerent communities was to reach
out to ‘ indigenous institutions such as shrines, sodalities and initiation
societies ’ because of their ‘ important role in the social and political life ’ of
many communities, particularly in Western and Eastern Nigeria. These
institutions functioned as unoﬃcial ‘nodes of a parallel system of govern-
ance whose inﬂuence was felt in social and economic matters ’. And
even though the challenge of Western education, Christianity and
Islam has pared down the prominence of traditional shrines and such like,
these still endure as sources of identity, authority and legitimacy within
many communities. So while political actors such as Uba and Ngige
do not openly subscribe to the traditional belief systems represented
by shrines such as Okija (both claim to be Christians), they share in
this historic tendency of political actors reaching out to such institutions
because of their enduring relevance as ‘ local centres of political inﬂu-
ence’ within communities (ibid. : 460). In short, traditional institutions re-
main relevant as political instruments for capturing and retaining state
power.
The Okija shrine, Ellis observed, ‘ functioned in a ﬁduciary capacity,
guaranteeing a solemn agreement between two parties. This appeared to
be its main role in dealings between politicians ’ (ibid. : 456). As was the
practice in the wider community where the shrine was sited, disagree-
ments were brought by various individuals and settled by sworn oaths that
were administered by the priests of the shrine, in the expectation that the
party that violated the oath would die within a year, thus vindicating the
surviving party (Nwabueze 2007: 118; Oba 2008: 153). Presumably, Uba’s
expectation in making Ngige swear the Okija oath was that the threat of
death would further constrain Ngige to honour their agreement. The
supernatural powers credited to religious traditional institutions such as
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the Okija shrine and their practices thus became one of the tools Uba used
to maintain his political inﬂuence over Ngige.
Moreover, the fact that Uba (the political godfather) and Ngige (the
politician) turned to the Okija shrine and its priests to serve as an arbiter
in their disagreement highlights a dynamic of political relations that is
diﬃcult to account for and often overlooked in conventional political
analysis ; that is the role of traditional institutions (or witchcraft) in political
processes and their inﬂuence on the creation and maintenance of relations
of power. It shows how the realms of the political and religious overlap
and inﬂuence each other. Politicians have historically sought out
traditional institutions for legitimacy and used them as custodians of
political agreements, with the result that the relationship between politics
and religion continues to be ﬂuid and integrated. The informal politics of
traditional religious institutions cannot be exhaustively explored in this
article, but suﬃce it to say that the relevance of such older institutions of
inﬂuence on both ‘ the notion of power and [to] the practice of modern
politics ’ has to be more fully accounted for in order to appreciate the
wider apolitical scope of inﬂuences on political decisions and outcomes
(Chabal & Daloz 1999: 73).
T H E C A S E O F T W O A R M E D R O B B E R S : P R E S I D E N T O B A S A N J O A N D
T H E A N A M B R A C R I S I S
The Anambra crisis was as much a matter of national-level power
dynamics as it was a matter of local politics. As already noted, Chief
Uba enjoyed a family relationship to President Obasanjo, and the pre-
sident’s reaction to the crisis reveals a great deal about the attitudes to
governance of the Nigerian political elite and its connections to national-
level politics. Obasanjo’s ﬁrst directive on receiving the news of Ngige’s
arrest was to instruct the PDP hierarchy to address the power struggle
between Ngige and Uba, and try to reconcile their factions. The pre-
sident’s immediate and sustained response was to frame the crisis as
mainly an intra-party aﬀair that was best resolved through negotiations
between senior members of the PDP. He did not consider it a consti-
tutional breach that demanded decisive action from the federal govern-
ment (The News 29.11.2004).
However, not every member of the PDP hierarchy shared Obasanjo’s
approach to the crisis. The PDP national legal adviser and a member of a
special Anambra ad hoc committee declared that the governor’s arrest
was a ‘ treasonable felony’ that was ‘no longer a PDP matter ’ but ‘a case
of thugs abducting the governor’, and would have to be severely dealt with
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by the federal government (ThisDay 13.11.2003). Outside the PDP, similar
views were expressed bymany prominent Nigerians and organisations who
called for treason charges to be made against those who masterminded the
arrest of an elected governor, an act that breached the gubernatorial im-
munity clause in section 308 of the 1999 Nigerian constitution. Still, de-
spite the growing national outcry and calls for heads to roll, President
Obasanjo remained conspicuously on the sidelines of the debate while the
PDP made frantic eﬀorts to handle the matter internally. The president
did order the compulsory retirement of the assistant inspector general of
police, Raphael Ige, who led the team of policemen that arrested Ngige,
but public reaction to the order to retire Ige was lukewarm because he was
due to formally retire anyway within the same month, after having served
the maximum number of years and the president failed to order a
criminal investigation within the police force that would uncover the
source of Ngige’s arrest order (Vanguard 18.7.2003). Even with the calls for
charges to be made against the principal actors in the crisis, particularly
Chris Uba, Obasanjo maintained his softly-softly approach to dealing with
the matter and the persons involved – a position that caused considerable
agitation across the country and among some members of his own party.
Based on a report from the PDP committee directed to investigate the
crisis, the PDP national chairman Chief Audu Ogbeh announced the
expulsion from the party of Chris Uba along with the deputy governor
Okey Udeh, House speaker Eucharia Azodo, House majority leader Peter
Onuorah, and Chuma Nzeribe, representative of Ihiala constituency, for
their involvement in the scandal. And in a move that began a public
confrontation between the party chairman and the president and resulted
in the chairman’s forced resignation, Ogbeh declared that the party had
only dealt with the political aspect of the crisis, and that the criminal
aspect fell within the purview of the executive arm of the government for
investigation and prosecution (Daily Champion 17.7.2003). Ogbeh’s position
countered the president’s advocacy of a political solution to what he per-
ceived as purely a political problem in Anambra.
In the wake of his announced dismissal from the PDP, Uba broke his
silence in a three-page statement to a newspaper rebuking Ngige for be-
traying his trust and bailing out of their ‘gentleman’s agreement’ (ThisDay
21.7.2003) ; and in an interview with another newspaper, Uba contested
his expulsion from the PDP and accused the party of betraying his loyalty.
He lamented: ‘I worked for the PDP in Anambra state. I helped the
party win the state. I spent money and made sure the party succeeded
in Anambra state. I delivered the state to the party but you can see their
decision on the matter is unfair … I operated one purse. I have an
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accountant who gives them [the PDP candidates] the money to run for
their election. So, I cannot say the money is one naira or two naira. But
you know about elections in Nigeria. It is very expensive’ (Daily Champion
25.7.2003).
Further assertions by Uba that he had not only sponsored Ngige’s
campaign, but also those of the deputy governor, the three PDP state
candidates who made it to the Senate, ten members of the House of
Representatives and thirty members of the House of Assembly revealed
how it was possible for Ngige’s removal and replacement to be stitched up
so seamlessly, and the extent of Uba’s political clout within the state
government (ThisDay 14.7.2003). Quite troubling for the president and the
PDP were the implications of Uba’s confessions for the public’s perception
of the party’s overwhelming victory in the state, particularly as the
Anambra Electoral Petition Tribunal was dealing with more petitions
concerning the conduct of the Anambra elections than for any other state
in the country (Vanguard 3.6.2003). The unease of the PDP was based on
the likelihood that any further revelations from Uba could potentially
unravel the fragile democratic legitimacy of the party’s electoral victory in
the state, the South-East zone and possibly across the country. Therefore,
in the days following Uba’s grandstanding to the press and a lawsuit ﬁled
by Uba to stop any attempt to arrest or try him for treason, the PDP began
to ease their demands for legal action by the government against Uba’s
faction by hinting that Uba’s expulsion from the party could be reversed if
he apologised for his actions (Vanguard 4.9.2003).
In yet another attempt by President Obasanjo to resolve the Anambra
crisis through the PDP leadership, a reconciliation committee led by the
then Senate president Adolphus Wabara and former Imo state governor
Chika Udenwa was set up in Owerri to settle the feud, which had begun to
threaten the cohesion of the party in the South-East zone. This eﬀort to
resolve the crisis internally as a so-called family aﬀair within the PDP
resulted in the Owerri accord, which basically acknowledged and granted
Uba inﬂuence over a certain number of Ngige’s political appointments :
‘a quasi-oﬃcial recognition’ that Chris Uba was an entitled political
benefactor of Ngige (Smith 2007: 129).
In spite of all these eﬀorts, reconciliation between Uba and Ngige and
their supporters was short-lived, and tensions in the state steadily escalated
into widespread violence in November 2004. Thugs reported to be sup-
porters of Uba attacked and looted major government buildings and com-
mercial centres, causing millions of naira in damage. As the mob carried
out their attacks, the police were seen standing by, making no attempts to
quell the violence or arrest those involved. Once again the police appeared
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culpable in the political war declared by Uba on Ngige. The onslaught of
violence in Anambra was widely speculated to have been sponsored by
Uba, in order to create a state of extreme disorder in Anambra that would
overwhelm Ngige’s administration and justify the president in terminating
his governorship by declaring a state of emergency, akin to the president’s
handling of the communal violence that rocked Plateau State. PDP
chairman Ogbeh asserted in an interview (Ogbeh 2005 int.) that the
escalation of the situation in Anambra and an apparent attempt on
Ngige’s life led to his public letter to Obasanjo, published in a daily
newspaper (The Punch 11.12.2004), which openly criticised Obasanjo’s fail-
ure to eﬀectively contain the Anambra crisis. Ogbeh wrote : ‘ I am deeply
troubled and I can tell you that an overwhelming percentage of our party
members feel the same way though many may never be able to say this to
you for a variety of reasons… On behalf of the People’s Democratic Party
I call on you to act now and bring any and all criminal, even treasonable,
activity to a halt. You and you alone have the means. Do not hesitate. We
do not have too much time to waste. ’
Obasanjo’s lengthy and very personal reply to Ogbeh was also pub-
lished in a daily newspaper, and contained strong language that revealed
his deep disappointment at what he had perceived as Ogbeh’s betrayal
(The Guardian 13.12.2004). The deeply personal tone of the letter revealed
his own familial interpretation of the events in Anambra,10 and highlights
two key issues worth exploring here: ﬁrst, his impression of Ngige’s
troubled relationship with his real father, and second, his description of
Uba and Ngige’s political relationship. Just as Ogbeh indicts Obasanjo for
failing to address the crisis in Anambra, so Obasanjo indicts Ngige for the
breakdown of his relationship with his father. In describing his ﬁrst contact
with Ngige, it is telling that the president felt it necessary to recount his
reaction to the news that Ngige was estranged from his father and the rest
of his family. Obasanjo shared his view that such a situation was some-
thing of a cultural abomination and that he had advised Ngige to reconcile
with his father. The weight given to a family dispute in Obasanjo’s im-
pression of Ngige’s character – that he seems to suggest might be mirrored
in his political dealings – indicates the ingress of familial and kinship
metaphors into Nigerian political life. Expectations about personal re-
lationships between kin are transferred to the realm of modern political
competition, as political actors create and maintain political associations
through ‘principles of mutual aid, of patron–client reciprocity, based on
the model of kin and family relations ’ (Chabal & Daloz 1999: 27). As
discussed earlier, political relationships are often imbued with familial
qualities of reciprocity, respect and loyalty. Obasanjo’s condemnation of
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Ngige’s behaviour towards his father suggests the possibility that the
president was unsurprised and equally disapproving of Ngige’s conduct
towards his political godfather. And his conclusion that the Anambra crisis
was ‘essentially a human organisational and human relationship issue’ that
was best resolved ‘as a family aﬀair ’ also shows that the president viewed
the attempt to remove Ngige and the resultant violence in Anambra as
outcomes that could have been avoided and could now be dealt with by
reconciling Ngige to his political godfather, Chris Uba (The Guardian
13.12.2004).
Obasanjo ﬁrst mentions Uba by name in his letter when he recounts a
report brought to him by Uba, revealing trouble with Ngige. Obasanjo
never explains the nature of the relationship between Uba and Ngige, or
the reasons why Uba’s concern would be so important that he would
appoint an ‘elder of the state ’ to settle their discord. He however admits to
the private meeting he had with Uba and Ngige, when Uba reminded
Ngige that his victory was won for him not by him. Obasanjo writes about
his shock at this revelation, but exposes his disingenuity by failing to pass
this damning confession to the Anambra state elections tribunal, or as
head of state initiating a federal investigation. Obasanjo’s recollection of
his meeting with Uba and Ngige becomes even more alarming when he
apparently counselled Uba and Ngige by comparing their conﬂict to a
case where two armed robbers rob a house, and one of the robbers decides
to keep the loot to himself refusing to share it with his accomplice.
Obasanjo’s primary concern in this unﬂattering analogy is the conduct of
the greedy robber – obviously Ngige – whom he condemns for not re-
cognising that there should be ‘ justice, fairness and equity ’ even among
robbers. That the president would characterise Uba and Ngige’s political
dealings as a conspiracy to loot a house, and indict the selﬁsh robber who
refused to share the loot, is further evidence of the general acceptance of a
pattern for political associations in Nigeria that is built on the exploitation
of public oﬃce for private gain. From Obasanjo’s perspective, Uba’s ex-
pectation that his support of Ngige’s candidacy would result in his access
to state resources was clearly reasonable and should have been honoured
by Ngige. This judgement coming from the president explains his attempts
to frame the Anambra crisis as an intra-party aﬀair, and his softly-softly
approach to Uba and Ngige’s fractured relationship.
The treatment of the crisis by Obasanjo underscores the pervasive
nature of godfather politics throughout Nigeria’s political hierarchy. The
president’s characterisation of Uba in his letter, as well as his many rec-
onciliatory eﬀorts, were evidence of Uba’s status as a prominent political
player in the Anambra saga. It also exposed how Uba’s inﬂuence
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transcended the internal politics of Anambra, and why the state or
national PDP hierarchy could not check his actions. The party’s eﬀort to
hold Uba accountable, though not completely consistent, received little
backing from the president or the executive arm of government.
Therefore they failed to stem the spiralling political scandal that had en-
gulfed Anambra.
: : :
The Anambra crisis exposed two realities of modern Nigerian politics.
First, it illustrates the limitations of the ruling party, the PDP, against the
power consolidated in the executive branch – the presidency – and that
this power is largely unchecked and substantially unbalanced by the
legislature and the judiciary. The Obasanjo presidency continued the
authoritarian pattern favoured by military dictators whereby the head of
state operated above the law. Since Obasanjo appointed himself as min-
ister in charge of the ministries of both power and petroleum, he was able
to control signiﬁcant portions of state ﬁnance with little accountability,
thus bulking up the ‘Oﬃce of President ’ as a parallel government. More-
over, due to this expanded role of the presidency, clientelistic beneﬁts such
as lucrative oil contracts and electriﬁcation projects were often allocated at
the discretion of the president’s oﬃce and not by the oﬃcials or ministries
directly in charge of these sectors of government. Thus, Uba’s connection
to the presidency in Abuja provided him with crucial political capital in
state and local politics. Second, the crisis exposed the highly presidential
nature of modern Nigerian politics and showed ‘ that power is intensely
personalised around the ﬁgure of the president. Not only is the political
elite typically an exceptionally narrow one, it is almost entirely based in
the capital city ’ (van de Walle 2003: 310). As the Anambra crisis has
shown, connections to Abuja were crucial to Uba’s ability to build a sup-
port base in the state and maintain his inﬂuence on events, regardless of
the extreme political disorder this caused within the state and the region.
The eight years of the Obasanjo presidency demonstrated the potent
concentration of power and resources at the apex of federal government,
and how the powers of the presidency can be used to subvert and control
democratic institutions and processes. The near-unmitigated supremacy
of the Obasanjo presidency and its allies in the Anambra crisis further
articulated the position of the ruling party in relation to the presidency,
and showed how powerful members of the party and Obasanjo loyalists
were able exploit their connections and maintain their positions of
patronage, even when unfavourable conditions resulted in Anambra.
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This article has discussed the political crisis of Anambra and attempted
to demonstrate how a practical approach that focuses on the behaviour of
political actors and their personalised relations of power provides a richer
framework for understanding African political culture. It has also argued
that political godfatherism is a consequence both of the personalised nature
of Nigerian politics and of the structure and internal dynamics of the
Nigerian party system. Though the case of Anambra provides an extreme
example of the godfatherism, corruption and violence that characterise
modern Nigerian politics, the actions of the judiciary provide reasons for
calm optimism. In March 2006, a court ruling that Ngige’s 2003 electoral
win was fraudulent and therefore null and void ended the Uba–Ngige saga.
Peter Obi, his electoral opponent from the opposition All Progressives
Grand Alliance (APGA), was declared the winner of the elections and
sworn in to replace Ngige. Unfortunately Obi’s tenure as governor also
suﬀered its share of setbacks, and in the 2007 gubernatorial polls Andy
Uba, the PDP candidate (former special adviser to Obasanjo and brother
of Chris Uba), was declared the winner of an openly fraudulent election.
Though the Nigerian Supreme Court reinstated Obi by declaring Uba’s
election null and void, the political intrigues in Anambra State remain
daily headline news.
This article has looked at the vertical personalised relationships that
inﬂuenced the politics of the 2003 Anambra elections and their aftermath
in an attempt to shed light on the wider phenomenon of godfatherism and
to energise this discourse. It has argued that vertical personalised re-
lationships such as those that linked former president Obasanjo to PDP
patron Chris Uba and then to Anambra governor Ngige prove to be more
proﬁtable and functional than horizontal relationships in oﬀering patrons
a channel through which they can attain prominence and social status,
and clients can receive protection and political support.
The article has also argued that the PDP demonstrates how the political
party system in Nigeria is heavily dependent on the inﬂuence of wealthy
and powerful ﬁgures to fund the operations of parties and their candidates
in exchange for access to the resources attached to political oﬃce. Thus
political parties are transactional platforms where party ﬁnanciers and
their clients exchange political support for the private use of state resources.
Democratic processes in Nigeria have so far functioned in this chaotic,
informal and unpoliced environment that suggests that relations of
patronage are necessary to alleviating uncertain outcomes.
Finally, the INEC has demonstrated its vulnerability to manipulation
and co-option by political godfathers intent on capturing the electoral
process. The commission’s argument that it has suﬀered from a lack of
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adequate funding is highly suspect because, although its budgetary allo-
cations are often less than adequate, it attracts hefty amounts of ﬁnancial
aid from the international community, such as the donation of over !3bn
made by a group of international organisations towards the 2007 elec-
tions.11 Large donations like this reﬂect the optimism of the international
community, and its faith in the power of elections to suﬃciently crack
open Nigeria’s democratic space, though the 2007 elections were to prove
no less traumatic than earlier ones.
N O T E S
1. Uba also had personal ties to President Obasanjo through his brother Andy Uba, who served
as Obasanjo’s special adviser on domestic aﬀairs and was married to the president’s wife’s sister ;
this arguably added to level of access and protection that Uba enjoyed under the Obasanjo pre-
sidency.
2. Although groups can be considered clients, they are not the relevant collective in this instance.
3. In several interviews with a prominent godfather based in the North-East, he repeatedly referred
to the politicians he had sponsored as ‘my candidates ’. Some members of the media refer to politicians
with known godfathers as ‘prote´ge´s ’.
4. Chris Ngige’s initial political ambition was to become the PDP ﬂag-bearer for the Anambra
central senatorial seat but it appears he was persuaded to stretch that ambition and aim for the
governorship of the state. He had even been announced the winner of the controversial national
assembly primaries by the PDP state electoral committee in an election that the head of the committee
had condemned as rigged. Ngige’s dual campaign for the senatorial and gubernatorial ticket was a
major source of the uncertainty and confusion that plagued the primaries. What is certain is that Ngige
opted out of the senatorial race at the last minute for the gubernatorial race. See ‘Protests trail PDP
national assembly’, ThisDay 10.1.2003, and ‘Irregularities mar Anambra PDP primaries’, Vanguard
30.12.2002.
5. In December 2002, the primary election panel led by General Salihu Ibrahim (rtd) had dis-
qualiﬁed Mbadinuju from participating in the primaries. The panel claimed petitions from market
women, civil servants and the clergy of Anambra protesting a second term for Mbadinuju had in-
formed their decision. However, a week after this announcement, the panel overturned this decision
and cleared Mbadinuju to contest the state gubernatorial primaries. See ‘Primaries : PDP clears
Mbadinuju, Nyame’, ThisDay 30.12.2002.
6. The Igwes had been murdered in Onitsha by the Bakassi Boys, a vigilante group that had been
adopted and was oﬃcially aﬃliated with the state government as the Anambra Vigilante Service
(AVS). Human Rights Watch (2002: 3) maintains that Mbadinuju was credibly linked to the murders
of Igwe and his wife over Igwe’s public criticism of Mbadinuju, openly calling for his resignation over
his failure to pay the salaries of government workers in the state for several months.
7. PDP members and aspirants expected the results to be announced at the various election venues
so they faulted the committee’s decision to transport the results to Enugu, because the likelihood that
the results could be manipulated was increased. In addition, there has been a noticeable trend
throughout the Anambra electoral crisis and its aftermath where important party meetings and
negotiations etc. that aﬀect Anambra directly are relocated to its neighbouring state, Enugu. Several
political observers have commented that this was because Uba’s country home is in Enugu and he
draws upon an extensive support base in the state.
8. After the result of the primaries had been cancelled, a PDP gubernatorial aspirant, Benson
Nnoruka, complained to a newspaper saying that no matter howmany times the primary was repeated
Mbadinuju would win. He argued that ‘ if people are handpicked, you can tell whom they will vote
for ’. See ‘Why not Mbadinuju? ’, Newswatch 3 February 2003.
9. After Ngige’s arrest in July 2003, the then speaker, Mrs Eucharia Azodo (a former personal
assistant and close relative to Uba), presented a letter to the State House of Assembly purportedly
signed by Ngige informing the House members that he had decided to resign from oﬃce for personal
reasons. On the basis of this letter, the House unanimously resolved to adopt a motion to swear in the
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deputy governor, Dr Okey Udey as governor to ﬁll the vacuum in government created by Ngige’s exit.
Udeh’s hasty promotion to governor was soon terminated by an intervention from Vice-President
Atiku Abubakar. According to newspaper reports, Ngige was able to place a desperate call from the
hotel where he was being held to the vice-president, who then contacted the inspector general of police
and ordered that Ngige be released.
10. Smith (2007) presents a thorough discussion of both letters in his book, which will not be revised
here.
11. The donation represented 10% of the overall budget spent on the 2007 elections.
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